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III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises out of the valuation of community property in the divorce of Susan 
Christine Parnell f/k/a Susan Christine Vierstra ("Susan") and Michael George Vierstra 
("Michael," and collectively with Susan, the "Vierstras"). Susan timely appealed to the District 
Court from the Magistrate's Amended Judgment and Decree of Divorce (the "Amended 
Judgment") and from the Magistrate's Order re: Post Trial Motions, contending that the 
Magistrate abused its discretion by factoring $1,006,000 of potential future tax into its valuation 
of the Vierstra dairy when such potential future tax was neither immediate nor specific. 
Susan further contended that the Magistrate erred when it failed to enforce the property 
division ordered by the Judgment and Decree of Divorce (the "Judgment") and the Amended 
Judgment by adjusting its valuation of the Vierstra dairy when the 2009 income taxes turned out 
to be less than one-tenth of the $1,006,000 anticipated by the Original and Amended Judgments. 
As a result of the Magistrate's errors, Susan has been deprived of approximately $460,000 of 
community assets, while affording a windfall to Michael in that same amount. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Susan filed a Complaint/or Divorce on September 19,2008. A trial occurred on October 
13-14,2009 and on November 19,20 and 24,2009. One ofthe key issues in the divorce 
involved the valuation of the Vierstra dairy. Following the trial, the Magistrate entered its 
Memorandum Decision on January 7, 2010 followed by the Judgment on January 25,2010, 
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which contemplated an award of the dairy to one of the parties and provided for an equalization 
payment to the other. The Magistrate entered an Amended Judgment and Decree of Divorce on 
April 29, 2010. 
Both parties filed various post-trial motions. On February 8,2010, the fourteenth (14th) 
day following the entry of the Judgment, Susan timely filed an Objection to the Form of the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce ("Plaintiff's Objection"), which was later supported by a 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Objection to the Form of the Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce ("Memorandum in Support"), filed March 25,2010. A contested hearing was held on 
the Plaintiff's Objection on April 27, 2010, after which the Amended Judgment was entered on 
April 29, 2010 in conformity with the changes ordered by the Court after hearing arguments by 
both parties. 
While the Plaintiff's Objection was pending, Susan filed her Motion to Petition the Court 
to Address the Adjustments ("Motion to Adjust") on April 23, 2010 (R. at 921) and supporting 
affidavit. (R. at 911). The Motion to Adjust sought to enforce the automatic adjustment to the 
equalization payment due to her to reflect the actual 2009 tax amount as ordered by the Original 
and Amended Judgments. Instead of enforcing its previous judgments and automatically 
adjusting the valuation of the Vierstra Dairy, the Magistrate re-opened the issue and received 
additional testimony on the subject at the hearing on May 12,2010, over Susan's objection. In 
the Order re: Post Trial Motions of May 18,2010 (R. at 1000), the Magistrate now held that 
some tax would come due over the next several years, although it was without proof ofthe 
$1,006,000 tax liability amount. The effect of this order was to reverse and modify the 
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Magistrate's previous finding and order which had required automatic adjustment of the 
valuation of the Vierstra Dairy if the 2009 taxes turned out to be any different than $1,006,000. 
Susan timely filed her Notice of Appeal from the Amended Judgment and Order Re: Post 
Trial Motions on June 10,2010. Oral argument for Susan's appeal was held on January 21, 
2011. On February 4,2011, the District Court entered sua sponte its Order for Supplemental 
Briefing Regarding District Court's Jurisdiction to Consider Appeal ("Order for Supplemental 
Briefing"). The Order for Supplemental Briefing contained preliminary observations suggesting 
that (1) the tax issue did not appear to be timely appealed because that holding was not altered by 
the Amended Judgment; and (2) the Magistrate did not appear to have jurisdiction to hold the 
May 12,2010 hearing which resulted in the Order Re: Post Trial Motions, thereby divesting 
jurisdiction from the district court to consider the conclusions therein. 
After receiving additional briefing on those issues, the District Court entered its 
Memorandum Opinion on Appeal on June 9, 2011 concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to 
consider Susan's appeal from the Amended Judgment regarding the tax issues arising in the 
Magistrate's valuation of the Vierstra Dairy. The Memorandum Opinion on Appeal also 
concluded that the District Court had jurisdiction to consider Susan's appeal from the Order Re: 
Post Trial Motions, but that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to modifY the Judgment regarding 
the valuation of the Vierstra Dairy. Therefore, the District Court concluded that the Magistrate 
could not consider Susan's Motion to Adjust and, accordingly, vacated paragraph 4 ofthe Order 
Re: Post Trial Motions which had denied Susan's motion to enforce the automatic adjustment. 
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On June 28,2011, Susan filed a Motion for Clarification seeking guidance on the 
practical effect of the District Court's Memorandum Opinion on Appeal, which offered no 
instruction for the parties or the Magistrate going forward. The Memorandum Opinion on 
Appeal simply vacated the Magistrate's denial of Susan's Motion to Adjust. Following a hearing 
on the matter on July 11,2011, the District Court took the matter under advisement. On July 13, 
2011, the District Court entered its Order Denying Motionfor Clarification by which the District 
Court refused to consider Susan's motion, holding that it was without jurisdiction to do so. 
Susan timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court on July 21, 2011. 
Susan's notice of appeal sought review ofthe District Court's dismissal of her issues on 
appeal as well as her Motion for Clarification. Susan additionally sought review by this Court of 
the original issues raised on appeal concerning (1) the inclusion of future tax consequences in the 
Magistrate's valuation of the Vierstra Dairy and (2) the Magistrate's denial of Susan's Motion to 
Adjust seeking enforcement of the Judgment and Amended Judgment. By order dated November 
2,2011, this Court granted Michael's motion to dismiss these two issues as they were not 
directly addressed at length in the District Court's Memorandum on Appeal. Additionally, Susan 
no longer seeks relief from the District Court's denial of her Motion for Clarification. 
Accordingly, those issues are not addressed herein, except as they may relate to Susan's 
remaining issues on appeal. 
c. Statement of Facts 
Susan and Michael were married on July 31, 1988. (Tr. 11120/09 Vol. III P. 182 L. 1-3). 
Susan filed for divorce on September 19,2008. The Vierstra dairy has been in operation for over 
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twenty years and throughout the marriage. In 1987, before the parties' marriage, Michael 
declared bankruptcy (Tr. 11124/09 Vol. I P. 89 L. 14-15). At the time oftheir marriage, Susan 
invested her separate funds into the dairy and Susan's father also helped the couple finance and 
expand the dairy. (Tr. 11/20109 Vol. II P. 131 L. 19-24); Tr. 11124/09 Vol. 1. P. 82 L. 15-25). 
Throughout the dairy's entire existence, Susan and Michael worked on the dairy and built it from 
the ground up. By the time that divorce proceedings were brought, the parties had amassed a 
dairy, feed lot and farmland that were all owned by the parties. 
The Vierstras used the cash method of reporting income and expenses to the I.R.S. (Tr. 
10114/09 Vol. II P. 143 L. 16-17). The cash method of accounting allowed them to recognize 
revenue on their tax return when they actually received it and deduct expenses when paid, as 
opposed to when the income was earned or the expenses were incurred. (Tr. 10114/09 Vol. II P. 
143 L. 19-21). In this manner, the Vierstras had the ability to control their tax liability, and 
whomever was awarded the dairy would also have the ability to "knock down their tax" by 
"simply getting prepaid inventory." (Tr. 10114/09 Vol. II P. 169 L. 16-P. 170 L. 1; Tr. 10114/09 
Vol. II P. 169 L. 8-20). 
At trial in the Fall of2009, Michael presented expert testimony from Buckner Harris 
("Harris") that approximately $1,006,000 in potential tax liability should be included in the 
valuation of the Vierstra dairy. (Tr. 11120/09 Vol. I P. 58 L. 16-18). Specifically, Michael 
testified that ifhe did not buy feed in the current year to offset the dairy's income, he would have 
a tremendous tax consequence. (Tr. 11/20109 Vol. III P. 231 L. 8-9). 
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After the trial concluded in the Fall of2009, the Magistrate found that "more likely than 
not, the Vierstra dairy will incur a tax consequence for the year 2009" and that "the tax 
consequence to be those shown in Exhibit 801A [$1,006,000]." (Memorandum Decision, at 17, 
19, R. at 561,563). However, the Magistrate instructed that "[i]fno tax consequence occurs, or 
ifthe tax consequence is different from that shown [by Michael's exhibit], the parties shall adjust 
the valuations and equalizations accordingly." (Memorandum Decision, at 19, R. at 563) 
(emphasis added). The Magistrate reiterated these same findings and instructions in its Amended 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce which were prepared by Defendant's counsel. (Amended 
Judgment, at 6 ~ 9, R. at 962). 
Rather than the approximately $1,006,000 tax liability presented at trial in the fall of 
2009, the actual 2009 taxes turned out to be approximately $85,000. (Tr. 05/12110 Vol. I P. 64 
L. 23-P. 65 L. 6).1 Prior to that time, neither Susan nor Michael knew what the exact tax liability 
would be for 2009-and, by extension, the exact valuation of the Vierstra Dairy-therefore, 
there was nothing to appeal or adjust in accordance with the Amended Judgment. After the 
actual amount became known and Michael refused to adjust the equalization payment due to 
Susan according to the actual tax liability for 2009 as ordered by the Judgment and Amended 
Judgment, Susan filed the Motion to Adjust. Susan's Motion to Adjust sought to enforce the 
automatic adjustment contained in the Magistrate's prior orders. Such adjustment was necessary 
because inclusion of the $1,006,000 in income tax liability (instead of the actual amount of 
approximately $85,000) decreased the dairy's value by a corresponding amount, meaning the 
I The transcripts from the hearing on post-trial motions do not provide line numbers. For the Court's ease of 
reference, line numbers have been manually counted and provided for the Court's review. 
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equalization payment due to Susan was significantly less than the equalization payment would 
have been had the Magistrate used the actual 2009 income tax liability in its calculations. 
At the conclusion of the hearing on post-trial motions, the Magistrate made limited oral 
findings on the potential tax liability. (Tr. 05/12/1 0 Vol. II P. 196 L. 6). In connection with its 
ruling, the Magistrate expressed understandable concern that it did not want to run the risk of 
disturbing Michael's financing and his corresponding equalization payment to Susan out of the 
proceeds of such financing: 
I've never thought, to be honest with you, that either party would be able to 
finance this ... , It turns out that Mike Vierstra does have a chance to finance this. 
The key ruling that I make today will determine, I suppose, whether that happens 
or not. ... 
(Tr. 05/12/10 Vol. lIP. 196 L. 21-25). The Magistrate then found that it did not believe that 
either value provided by the two parties was realistic: 
Ijust don't [sic] that this thing actually has a value of- of the One Million, so it is 
the Eighty Thousand or is it the One Million, because I have to pick one of the 
two and I honestly don't believe that either one of those numbers is what should 
be ordered by the Court, but that's the evidence I have been given. 
(Tr. 05/12/10 Vol. II P. 197 L. 6-9) (emphasis added). The Magistrate then selected Michael's 
characterization of the tax liability in order to protect the pending financing and invited the 
parties to seek review of his decision by the appellate courts (at which time the financing would 
be complete): 
I also think the parties are better protected by my ruling that way. . .. I find that 
by the preponderance of the evidence, it's the One Million Dollars. I would also 
say this. By the choice I've made today, if I'm wrong on [sic 1 an appellate court 
will tell me and there will be Four Hundred Thousand Dollars more ordered down 
the road to be paid to Susan. IfI'm right, then I made the right decision today and 
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any appeals was [sic] wasted time. . .. But the other thing that would happen is 
that if we sell it in today's market, I'm not too sure that either of these two people 
would serve [sic] by it. 
(Tr. 05112110 Vol. lIP. 197 L. 10-18) (emphasis added). 
The Magistrate issued its Order re: Post Trial Motions on May 18,2010, which refused 
to enforce the automatic adjustment, thereby altering its previous orders contained in the 
Judgment and Amended Judgment. The Magistrate acknowledged that to do otherwise would 
cause Michael's financing to fall through and that it would be "unwise for the Court to cause the 
sale of the dairy because it would result in less money paid to both parties." (Order re: Post 
Trial Motions, at 4 ~ 4, R. at 1003-04). Following the Magistrate's Order re: Post Trial 
Motions, Michael's financing of the dairy closed on May 27,2010, at which time Michael made 
an equalization payment to Susan of approximately $380,000, which amount was approximately 
$460,000 less than he would have been required to pay had the Magistrate enforced its prior 
orders by implementing the automatic adjustment. 
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IV. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the District Court erred by dismissing Susan's appeal from the Order Re: Post Trial 
Motions entered by the Magistrate Court on May 18,2010 for lack of jurisdiction? 
Whether the District Court erred by dismissing the appeal from the Amended Judgment entered 
on April 29, 2010 for lack of jurisdiction? 
Susan is entitled to costs and attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho law, including LA.R. 
40, LA.R. 41 and I.C. § 12-121. 
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v. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
When reviewing a decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, this Court 
directly reviews the district court's decision. Mackowiak v. Harris, 146 Idaho 864, 865,204 
P .3d 504, 505 (2009). If substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate's findings 
offact, the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings, and the district court 
affirms the magistrate, this Court affirms the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. 
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008). A question of jurisdiction is 
fundamental and should be addressed prior to considering the merits of an appeal. Ratkowski v. 
Ratkowski, 115 Idaho 692, 693, 769 P.2d 569, 570 (1989). 
A trial court's disposition of community property is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Chandler v. Chandler, 136 Idaho 246, 249, 32 P.3d 140, 143 (2001). When a trial court's 
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry 
to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 
87,94,803 P.2d 993,1000 (1991). In evaluating a Magistrate's exercise of discretion, an 
appellate court "examine [ s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and 
competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's 
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conclusions oflaw follow from those findings." Crump v. Bromley, 148 Idaho 172, 173,219 
P .3d 1188, 1189 (2009). 
B. Whether the District Court erred by dismissing Susan's appeal from the Order Re: 
Post Trial Motions entered by the Magistrate Court on May 18, 2010 for lack of 
jurisdiction? 
One of the issues presented to the District Court concerned whether the Magistrate erred 
by failing to enforce the Judgment and Amended Judgment as written by automatically adjusting 
the valuation of the Vierstra Dairy based on the actual 2009 tax figures. Both the Judgment and 
Amended Judgment contain the following language: 
The court finds the tax consequence to be incurred by Vierstra Dairy in 2009 is as 
shown on Exhibit 801(a) [$1,006,000]. The court finds that it is more likely than 
not that Vierstra Dairy will incur the tax consequence. The party who receives 
the dairy will timely pay said taxes to the State ofIdaho and the Internal Revenue 
Service. If no tax consequence occurs, or if the tax consequence is different from 
that shown in Exhibit 801(a), the parties shall adjust the valuations and 
equalizations accordingly. If necessary, the parties can petition the court to 
address the adjustments. The court orders the parties to timely file tax returns and 
other filings concerning the Vierstra Dairy. 
(Judgment, at 6 ~ 9, R. at 602; Amended Judgment, at 6 ~ 9, R. at 962) (emphasis added). The 
actual tax liability for 2009 was only $85,172, not $1,006,000. Therefore, Susan attempted to 
enforce that provision in accordance with its terms. Michael refused to adjust the equalization 
payment on his own initiative and pay the actual amount due to Susan. Subsequently, Susan's 
Motion to Adjust, which sought to judicially enforce the terms of the Judgment and Amended 
Judgment, was denied by the Order Re: Post Trial Motions. 
Susan timely appealed this issue to the District Court which dismissed on jurisdictional 
grounds. The District Court acknowledged that it had jurisdiction to consider Susan's appeal of 
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this issue, but nevertheless dismissed Susan's appeal holding that the Magistrate "lacked 
jurisdiction to modify the tax liability and valuation of the Vierstra Dairy." (Memorandum 
Opinion on Appeal, at 9, R. at 1244). This holding was erroneous. 
1. Susan's Motion to Adjust sought enforcement of the Judgment and Amended 
Judgment, not modification. 
The District Court misconstrued the nature of Susan's Motion to Adjust as well as the 
Magistrate's order regarding the valuation of the Vierstra Dairy contained in the Judgment and 
Amended Judgment. The District Court analyzed only the invitation to the parties to "petition the 
court to address the adjustments," if necessary. Then it determined that between Susan's Motion 
to Adjust and the invitation to petition the court, if necessary, there was nothing investing the 
Magistrate with jurisdiction to modify the judgment. However, in analyzing Susan's Motion to 
Adjust to determine whether it qualified as an I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion,2 the District Court even 
observed that the Motion to Adjust "sought enforcement of the [automatic adjustment] language 
contained in the Judgment." (Memorandum Opinion on Appeal, at 8, R. at 1242) (emphasis 
added). 
This Court has held that "[i]n the absence of an appeal from an original decree of divorce 
the property divisions portions ofthat decree are final, res judicata, and no jurisdiction exists to 
modify property provisions of a divorce decree." McBride v. McBride, 112 Idaho 959,961, 739 
P.2d 258,260 (1987). However, this Court also recently held that "this is an entirely separate 
2 In Susan's Supplemental Brief to the District Court on the jurisdictional issues raised by the Order for 
Supplemental Briefing, Susan proposed that the Motion to Adjust could be interpreted as either a Rule 60(b) motion 
investing the Magistrate with jurisdiction, or alternatively, as purely a motion to enforce which would require 
imposition of the automatic adjustment, as contained in the Judgment and Amended Judgment, as written. 
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inquiry from whether the court has jurisdiction to enforce [property provisions]." Barley v. 
Smith, 149 Idaho 171,178,233 P.3d 102, 109 (2010) (emphasis in original). Indeed, this Court 
noted that "[t]he McBride Court appears to indicate that a party to a property settlement 
agreement that is not merged may seek court enforcement where the other party has failed to 
carry out the terms ofthe agreement." Id. at n.2. 
In Barley, two parties were divorced pursuant to a Judgment and Decree of Divorce with 
an attached Property Settlement Agreement. Subsequently, the wife filed a Motion to Divide an 
Omitted Asset concerning the division of certain convertible notes and stock allocations awarded 
to husband by virtue of his employment with United Airlines. The dispute centered on whether 
such benefits were unintentionally omitted from the Property Settlement Agreement or how such 
benefits should be divided under that agreement. This Court held that the Property Settlement 
Agreement had not merged into the Decree and, therefore, the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to 
modifY that agreement. Barley, 149 Idaho at 177,233 P.3d at 108. However, as noted 
previously, the Court's inquiry did not end there. 
The Court next analyzed the content ofthe wife's Motion to Divide an Omitted Asset. In 
so doing, the Court held that "a mislabeled claim may be treated according to its substance." Id. 
quoting Carroll v. MBNA America Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 268, 220 P.3d 1080, 1087 (2009). Even 
though the wife's motion was proffered as a motion to divide an omitted asset (which would 
require a modification of the property agreement), "the thrust ofthe inquiry" occasioned thereby 
"was primarily directed toward interpreting the court-approved Agreement to determine whether 
the assets in question were divided therein." Id. Therefore, as pertaining to the magistrate's 
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jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the terms of the decree and property settlement agreement, 
the Court held: 
It certainly had the jurisdiction to do so under Idaho Code section 32-713, which 
provides that the court, in rendering a decree of divorce, must make an 
appropriate order for the disposition of the community property. The court has 
the power under Idaho Code sections 1-1603 and 1-1901, to enforce its orders. In 
this case, because we find that the assets in question-the convertible notes and 
stock allocations-were community property at the time of the divorce and 
divided pursuant to the Agreement, the magistrate court had jurisdiction to 
interpret and enforce the terms of the Agreement. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Just as in Borley, Susan's Motion to Adjust did not seek a modification ofthe Judgment 
or Amended Judgment, but rather, it sought enforcement ofthe mandatory adjustment. This was 
even observed by the District Court, however it then failed to implement the proper analysis. If 
Susan were granted the relief requested by her motion, neither the Judgment nor Amended 
Judgment would have changed. The relief requested by Susan had already been provided in the 
Magistrate's previous orders which were both drafted by Michael's counsel-which should 
foreclose any argument by Michael on appeal that the Judgment and Amended Judgment should 
be construed in any way contrary to their plain language. In Borley, this Court observed that: 
It should be noted that Borley was the party who drafted the Decree for the court 
to sign. Thus, it seems disingenuous for Borley to now claim that the very 
document she drafted is ambiguous and subject to an interpretation at odds with 
the language she wrote in the Decree. 
Borley, 149 Idaho at n. 1 (emphasis added). 
The Judgment and Amended Judgment both provide that "the tax consequence to be 
incurred by Vierstra Dairy in 2009 is as shown on Exhibit 801(a) [$1,006,000] .... Ifno tax 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 18 -
consequence occurs, or if the tax consequence is different from that shown in Exhibit 801(a), the 
parties shall adjust the valuations and equalizations accordingly." (Judgment, at 6,-r 9, R. at 602; 
Amended Judgment, at 6,-r 9, R. at 962) (emphasis added). The term "shall" is a mandatory term. 
See Mihalka v. Shepherd, 145 Idaho 547, 553, 181 P.3d 473,479 (2008). Therefore, ifthe taxes 
for 2009 turned out to be different than the approximately $1,006,000 figure upon which the 
magistrate relied, the parties had a mandatory obligation to adjust the valuation accordingly. The 
effect of the Judgment and Amended Judgment was to require Michael to supply the valuation 
deficiency to Susan as soon as the 2009 taxes were affirmatively ascertained. He did not comply 
with this order and Susan was left with no option but to seek enforcement. 
The facts of this case are nearly identical to the situation presented in Barley, except in 
Barley the property allocation was included in the Property Settlement Agreement, whereas in 
this case, the property allocation was included directly in the Judgment and Amended Judgment. 
In both cases, the property in question was community property that was subject to a final 
adjudication and allocation pursuant to a divorce decree. Additionally, the actual value could not 
be determined until the occurrence of future events. In Barley, the husband did not earn a vested 
interest in all of his convertible notes and stock options through United Airlines until after 
completing a period of continued employment after the decree and Property Settlement 
Agreement were entered. In this case, the Magistrate's valuation of the Vierstra Dairy could not 
be ascertained until the 2009 tax liability was determined because the actual amount due in taxes 
for 2009 was not known at the time of trial but was speculated by the parties. In both cases, the 
spouses filed post-judgment motions to address the necessary adjustments once the future 
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contingencies had been ascertained. Accordingly, just as in Barley, Susan's motion must be 
treated as one seeking enforcement, not modification. The District Court correctly observed that 
Susan's Motion to Adjust sought enforcement, but then failed to apply the Barley analysis and 
remand for the Magistrate to implement and enforce the provisions of the Judgment and 
Amended Judgment. 
The irony in the Magistrate's actions, and the District Court's holding on appeal, is that 
by denying Susan's motion seeking enforcement of the automatic adjustment, the Magistrate 
modified the property allocation of the Judgment and Amended Judgment. The District Court 
effectively blessed this modification while at the same time dismissing Susan's appeal on the 
grounds that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to modify the property allocations. The District 
Court should have focused on Michael's failure to bring any motion or appellate procedure 
vesting the Magistrate with jurisdiction to modify its previous order. Susan wanted the 
Judgment and Amended Judgment enforced, but the Magistrate reconsidered the issue over 
Susan's objection and modified its previous order sua sponte without any motion to modify 
properly before it. Accordingly, the Magistrate did not have jurisdiction to modify its previous 
order and should have enforced it, as written. The District Court erred by analyzing Susan's 
Motion to Adjust as a motion for modification and dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction instead of 
analyzing Susan's motion as one seeking enforcement, as the District Court even acknowledged, 
and requiring the Magistrate to implement the automatic adjustment under the Barley analysis. 
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2. The automatic adjustment contained in the Judgment and Amended Judgment was 
not erroneous. 
Part of the District Court's analysis in the Memorandum Opinion on Appeal appears to 
question, but not explicitly condemn, the language of the automatic adjustment and the invitation 
to petition the Magistrate to address the adjustments contained in the Judgment and Amended 
Judgment. After quoting this language, with emphasis on the invitation to petition the Magistrate 
to address the adjustments, the District Court observed: 
This language appears to contemplate a procedure for post-judgment modification 
of the property division portions ofthe Judgment. It does not refer to a specific 
statute, rule or case law that would authorize post-judgment property and debt 
division and allocation. It is not clear whether the Magistrate contemplated a 
separate procedure for the modification of the property division portions ofthe 
Judgment. 
(Memorandum Opinion on Appeal, at 7, R. at 1242). It is unclear to what extent, if any, this 
observation factored into the District Court's holding that the "Magistrate lacked the jurisdiction 
to modify the tax liability and valuation of the Vierstra Dairy." (Memorandum Opinion on 
Appeal, at 9, R. at 1244). To the extent it played any role in the District Court's analysis, it was 
clearly erroneous. 
As noted above, the reasoning underlying the District Court's language quoted above was 
based on a fundamental misconstruction of the nature of what the Magistrate had ordered and 
what Susan was seeking to accomplish. The language of the Judgment and Amended Judgment 
ordering an automatic adjustment and inviting the parties to petition the court, if necessary, was 
not a procedure for post-judgment modification. Rather it was a procedure for post-judgment 
implementation and enforcement. As discussed at length above, the automatic adjustment was 
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set in stone. Nothing would have changed through Susan's motion or the Magistrate's invitation 
to bring such a petition. The Judgment and Amended Judgment provide that the valuation of the 
Vierstra Dairy shall be reduced by the 2009 taxes. The value ordered by the Magistrate of the 
Vierstra Dairy can best be summarized as follows: 
[Net Value] = [Gross Pre-Tax Value (as found by Magistrate)] - [actual 2009 tax liability] 
At the time of the Judgment and Amended Judgment, the Magistrate believed the 2009 
tax liability to be $1,006,000. However, its orders provide that regardless of what it found at that 
time, the actual valuation would incorporate only the actual 2009 tax liability that came due. 
That liability was later ascertained to be only $85,172, thus triggering the implementation ofthe 
automatic adjustment. This automatic adjustment could then be enforced by the Magistrate 
without a separate proceeding, or the necessary jurisdiction attendant to such proceeding. See 
Barley, 149 Idaho at 178,233 P.3d at 109 (holding that there is no need for the parties to seek 
relief in a separate action when a post-judgment motion seeks interpretation and enforcement). 
Indeed, before bringing the Motion to Adjust, Susan first sought to have Michael make payment 
of the amount owed to her under the adjusted calculation. It was not until it became apparent 
that such payment was not forthcoming that Susan deemed it necessary to "petition the court to 
address the adjustments." 
Trial courts in proceedings involving the division of community property frequently 
order that property be subject to future sale, refinance or other conditions upon the occurrence of 
future events, or sometimes even without any future requirements attached. See, e.g., Devine v. 
Cluff, 111 Idaho 476, 725 P .2d 181 (et. App. 1986) (analyzing, in part, the effect of a provision 
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contained in a judgment causing automatic forfeiture of a property easement based on a party's 
failure to obtain a survey within six months of the judgment). Additionally, the issues in Barley 
revolved around the division of assets that were contingent at the time the decree and Property 
Settlement Agreement were entered. Once the husband's vested interest in those assets was 
ascertained post-judgment, this Court ultimately determined that those assets that were 
specifically included in the Property Settlement Agreement's equal division between the spouses 
(the convertible notes) should be valued and divided according to that agreement. See Barley, 
149 Idaho at 187,233 P.3d at 118. 
Even in the present case, the actual value of the Vierstra Dairy was not the only provision 
relative to that item of community property that was left to future contingencies. Neither the 
Judgment nor the Amended Judgment explicitly provided who would be awarded the Vierstra 
Dairy or what the exact value would be. However, fixed procedures were put in place to 
determine both the identity of the purchaser and the price. Susan was given the first right of 
refusal. If she did not exercise that right, a procedure was put into place whereby Michael could 
purchase the Dairy. Ifhe did not exercise that right, it would be sold to a third party. Just as the 
identity of the purchaser was not expressly ordered, but rather fixed to the occurrence or 
nonoccurrence of certain events, the price was also fixed at the amount found by the court 
subject to the determination ofthe actual value of the 2009 taxes. Ifthe 2009 tax liability were 
$2,000,000, Michael might have argued that Susan owed him her share of that liability. 
Likewise, as is the case, if the tax turned out to be only $85,000, Michael owes Susan half of the 
difference. No modification was necessary in order for those procedures to take effect. The 
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valuation and distribution of the Vierstra Dairy was fixed as of the date of the Amended 
Judgment and neither party sought a modification of those provisions. 
Accordingly, the District Court erred by construing the Magistrate's orders and Susan's 
Motion to Adjust as inviting modification of the property valuation and allocation, even while 
acknowledging that Susan's motion merely sought enforcement. Because the property valuation 
and allocation concerning the Vierstra Dairy was fixed, the Magistrate had jurisdiction to 
implement and enforce the automatic adjustment contained in its prior orders. The District 
Court's holding that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to entertain Susan's motion seeking 
enforcement of the Judgment and Amended Judgment was erroneous. 
C. Whether the District Court erred by dismissing the appeal from the Amended 
Judgment entered on April 29, 2010 for lack of jurisdiction? 
Susan timely appealed from the Amended Judgment arguing that the Magistrate erred by 
including a speculative tax liability in its valuation of the Vierstra Dairy that was not immediate 
and specific. The District Court dismissed Susan's appeal of this issue holding that it lacked 
jurisdiction to consider the appeal because Susan failed to timely appeal this issue from the 
Judgment. In doing so, the District Court held that none of the intervening motions by the 
parties tolled the time period for filing a notice of appeal. Because the tax liability portion of the 
Judgment remained unchanged in the Amended Judgment, the District Court held that the 42-day 
time period for filing a notice of appeal of that issue ran from the entry of the Judgment. The 
District Court's dismissal of Susan's appeal of this issue was erroneous. 
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The District Court had jurisdiction to consider the erroneous inclusion of the speculative 
tax liability in the valuation of the Vierstra Dairy contained in the Judgment and subsequently in 
the Amended Judgment. If the Judgment was a final order in the case, then according to LA.R. 
14( a), the time for filing a notice of appeal terminated upon the timely filing of the Plaintiff's 
Objection and began to run anew from the entry of the order resolving the issues raised by the 
Plaintiff's Objection. That order was the Amended Judgment. Accordingly, Susan timely 
appealed the issue ofthe speculative tax liability from the Amended Judgment. 
Alternatively, ifthe Judgment was not final because it provided for automatic adjustment 
of the valuation if the 2009 taxes varied from the amount of$I,006,000, then the Order re: Post 
Trial Motions, with its refusal to adjust the valuation and equalization payment after the 2009 
taxes turned out to be only $85,000, served as the operative order that finally adjudicated the 
parties' claims for relief requested by the pleadings. Accordingly, if the Judgment was not final, 
Susan has also timely appealed the tax issue from the Order re: Post Trial Motions. 
Furthermore, no individual issues were certified as final in the Judgment. Accordingly, 
the Judgment as a whole can only be considered a final judgment if it resolved all of Susan and 
Michael's claims for relief. Idaho Appellate Rule 11 allows for an appeal as a matter of right 
from final judgments, as defined by LR.C.P. 54(a). Rule 54(a) defines "Judgment" as: 
[AJ separate document entitled Judgment or Decree. A judgment shall state the 
relief to which a party is entitled on one or more claims for relief in the action. 
Such relief can include dismissal with or without prejudice. A judgment shall not 
contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, the record of prior 
proceedings, courts legal reasoning, findings of fact, or conclusions oflaw. A 
judgment is final if either it has been certified as final pursuant to subsection 
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(b)(1) of this rule or judgment has been entered on all claims for relief, except 
costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action. 
(Emphasis added). "Until all claims for relief in this lawsuit have been resolved by entry of a 
judgment, there is no final judgment." Harrison v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 
149 Idaho 201, 206, 233 P.3d 132, 137 (2010) citing In re Universe Life Ins. Co., 144 Idaho 751, 
755, 171 P.3d 242, 246 (2007); Piske v. Freeman, 143 Idaho 832, 833, 153 P.3d 1178, 1179 
(2007); LR.C.P. 54(b). "The judgment sought is a final determination of a claim or claims for 
relief in the lawsuit." Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Investment, L.L.c., 148 Idaho 616, 
619,226 P.3d 1263, 1266 (2010). 
The claims relevant to the property distribution raised by the pleadings were (1) "[t]hat 
the Court equitably divide the community property and debts," (Complaint for Divorce, at 6, R. 
at 22); and (2) "[t]he net community estate after considering taxes should be equally divided," 
(Answer to Complaint and Counterclaim, at 3, R. at 35). Concerning the tax liability, the 
Judgment provided: 
The court finds the tax consequence to be incurred by Vierstra Dairy in 2009 is as 
is shown on Exhibit 801(A) [$1,006,000]. The Court finds that it is more likely 
than not that Vierstra Dairy will incur the tax consequence. The party who 
receives the dairy will timely pay said taxes to the State of Idaho and the Internal 
Revenue Service. If no tax consequence occurs, or if the tax consequence is 
different from that shown in Exhibit 801ea), the parties shall adjust the valuations 
and equalizations accordingly. If necessary, the parties can petition the court to 
address the adjustments. The court orders the parties to timely file tax returns and 
other filings concerning the Vierstra Dairy. 
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Id. at,-r 9 (emphasis added). Regardless of whether the above-described language contained in 
the Judgment (as drafted by Michael's counsel) was or was not a final judgment, the District 
Court had jurisdiction to consider Susan's appeal. 
1. If the Judgment was final, I.A.R. 14 provides that the Plaintiff's Objection (filed 
February 8, 2010) extended the appeal deadline for 42 days following the entry of 
the Amended Judgment (entered on April 29, 2010) that resolved the Plaintiff's 
Objection. 
One manner to extend the time for filing an appeal following a final judgment is to file a 
timely objection or motion following the entry of the decree. Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) 
provides, in relevant part: 
The time for an appeal from any civil judgment or order in an action is terminated 
by the filing of a timely motion which, if granted, could affect any findings of 
fact, conclusions oflaw or any judgment in the action ... in which case the 
appeal period for all judgments or orders commences to run upon the date of the 
clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such motion. 
(Emphasis added). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has considered the effect that objections to a judgment have 
on the time for filing a notice of appeal. The Court has held: 
The district court's judgment awarding damages in this case was filed on October 
1, 1997. Both parties filed motions objecting to portions of the judgment. These 
motions did extend the time to appeal from the October 1, 1997 judgment because 
they could have "affect[ed] ... findings of fact, conclusions oflaw or ... [the] 
judgment in the action." LA.R. 14(a). The district court issued an order on 
November 4, 1997, denying these motions. As of that date no further motions 
were pending that could affect the damage award. The time to appeal from the 
judgment for damages therefore began to run on November 4, 1997. 
Walton, Inc. v. Jensen, 132 Idaho 716, 719, 979 P.2d 118, 121 (Ct. App. 1999). In such cases, 
the 42-day period for filing a notice of appeal is terminated upon filing of an objection to a 
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judgment and begins to run anew, upon the issuance of an order resolving the motion. See Floyd 
v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Bonneville County, Idaho, 137 Idaho 718, 52 P.3d 863, (2002). See also E. 
Idaho Health Servs. v. Burtenshaw, 122 Idaho 904, 841 P.2d 434 (1992) overruled on other 
grounds by Floyd v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Bonneville County, Idaho, 137 Idaho 718, 52 P.3d 863 
(2002); Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690,838 P.2d 293 (1992); Sinclair Mktg. v. Siepert, 107 
Idaho 1000, 1006,695 P.2d 385, 391 (1985) ("The time before the post-judgment motion does 
not accumulate with the time after disposition. Rather, the time commences anew after the 
disposition of the timely post-judgment motion."). 
In Cecil v. Gagnebin, 146 Idaho 714, 202 P.3d 1 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court 
directly addressed the application of LA.R. 14( a) to the time for filing a notice of appeal from a 
final judgment. In that case, a judgment was entered on March 8, 2007, based upon a stipulated 
settlement between the parties. When the trial court discovered that one of the parties had not 
signed the stipulation, it later granted summary judgment to Cecil and entered an amended 
judgment to that effect on April 30, 2007. On May 8, 2007, Cecil filed a motion to correct the 
amended judgment based on an incorrect boundary line description. On May 14, 2007, the trial 
court entered an order granting costs and attorney's fees to Cecil. Then, on June 12,2007, the 
trial court entered its second amended judgment correcting the boundary line description. 
Gagnebin filed a notice of appeal on July 20,2007. 
One of the issues on appeal in Cecil concerned whether the Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction to consider Gagnebin's appeal from the award of costs and attorney's fees to Cecil 
since Gagnebin's notice of appeal was filed 67 days after the entry of that order. The Idaho 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 28-
Supreme Court held that it did have jurisdiction to consider the issue. The Court reasoned that 
according to LA.R. 14(a), the filing of the Motion to Amend the Amended Judgment on May 8, 
2007, "terminated the running of the time for appeal, and it did not begin to run until the order 
deciding the motion was filed. The motion was decided by the district court when it filed the 
second amended judgment on June 12,2007." Cecil, 146 Idaho at 719, 202 P.3d at 6. 
According to the Cecil decision and the plain language ofLA.R. 14(a), there is no 
reguirement that the intervening motion or objection be related to any specific finding of fact, 
conclusion oflaw, or judgment that is ultimately appealed. Rather, the plain language of the 
rule, as supported by applicable case law, provides that the 42-day time period for filing a notice 
of appeal from a final judgment is terminated, and not simply paused, by "the filing of.§: timely 
motion which, if granted, could affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment 
in the action." LA.R. 14(a) (emphasis added). 
This analysis is in harmony and clearly distinguishable from State v. Payan, 128 Idaho 
866,920 P.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1996), cited in the District Court's Memorandum Opinion on Appeal. 
In Payan, there was no relevant, timely motion or objection filed that invoked LA.R. 14( a). 
Several months after entry of the judgment, the district court entered an amended judgment 
which added a provision granting Payan credit for time served. Payan argued that his untimely 
appeal from the judgment was made timely by the subsequent entry of the amended judgment. 
The Court of Appeals held that the mere issuance of an amended judgment, with nothing more, 
and "which did not alter any of the terms from which Payan now appeals, did not serve to extend 
the period for filing an appeal or begin that period anew." Id. at 868, 920 P.2d at 84. However, 
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the Court acknowledged that ifPayan had filed a timely LC.R. 35 motion for a reduction of 
sentence, he could have extended the time for filing an appeal pursuant to LA.R. 14. See also 
State v. Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305, 308, 246 P.3d 958, 961 (2010) citing LA.R. 14(a) (emphasis 
added) ("Similarly, a party's motion capable of affecting the judgment may extend the 42-day 
period, but only if such motion is filed within 14 days of the judgment."). 
In this case, on February 8, 2010, the fourteenth (14th) day following the entry ofthe 
Judgment, Susan timely filed the Plaintiff's Objection (R. at 728), which was later supported by 
a Memorandum in Support, filed March 25, 2010. (R. at 889). The Memorandum in Support 
provided (1) objections to various factual findings in the Judgment; (2) objections to various 
redundant and unnecessary references to prior orders; (3) objections to the inclusion of various 
one-sided statements from the Magistrate's Memorandum Decision; (4) an objection to the 
excessive length ofthe Judgment; and (5) a request to quash the Judgment in its entirety and 
request that it be replaced in its entirety with a proposed replacement Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce, attached to the Memorandum in Support, to be entered nunc pro tunc. A hearing was 
held on Plaintiff's Objection on April 27, 2010, after which the Amended Judgment was entered 
on April 29, 2010 in conformance with the Court's decision on Plaintiff's Objection. 
The Plaintiff's Objection and the Memorandum in Support clearly implicate the 
provisions of LA.R. 14( a). The lengthy list of objections to various facts contained in the 
Judgment, together with the objections to the form of the Judgment and the request to quash the 
Judgment and replace it in its entirety, if granted, would have affected "any findings offact, 
conclusions of law or any judgment in the action." LA.R. 14(a) (emphasis added). The District 
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Court's Memorandum Opinion on Appeal appears to hold that a Rule 59(e) motion must seek to 
"correct legal and factual errors occurring in proceedings before it." (Memorandum Opinion on 
Appeal, at 4, R. at 1239). The District Court bases its analysis on the case of Straub v. Smith, 
145 Idaho 65, 71, 175 P.3d 754, 760 (2007), in which this Court notes that Rule 59(e) can be 
used to correct legal and factual errors. According to the District Court, because the Plaintiff's 
Objection did not sufficiently highlight specific factual or legal errors, it could not be construed 
as a motion to alter or amend the judgment which would terminate the time for filing a notice of 
appeal. This holding was erroneous. 
The Plaintiff's Objection raised several issues with factual findings contained in the 
Judgment and, notably, requested to quash the Judgment in its entirety. At that point, the status 
of the Judgment itself was in question. Any appeal at that point, of any issue, would have been 
premature until the operative final order in the case was issued and the time for altering or 
amending that order had run. This is precisely the value behind LA.R. 14( a). It allows all 
uncertainty regarding the form and substance of the final order to settle prior to the running of 
the time for filing a notice of appeal. At the time ofthe Plaintiff's Objection, neither party knew 
exactly what the final order would look like. The fact that little ultimately changed in the 
Amended Judgment, which was entered after a contested hearing on the matter, is oflittle 
consequence. The time for filing an appeal was, therefore, terminated until that objection was 
resolved by a file-stamped order. A hearing was held on the Plaintiff's Objection, and the order 
that followed from that hearing was the Amended Judgment. Thus, Susan's timely Notice of 
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Appeal from the Amended Judgment is effective as to all the findings, conclusions, and 
judgments contained therein. 
Additionally, the District Court confused the rules regarding termination of the time for 
filing a notice of appeal in the criminal versus the civil context. The District Court held that "[i]f 
an amended judgment is entered that does not change a particular disposition in an original 
judgment, the time for appeal on that disposition [sic] issue begins on the date ofthe original 
judgment." (Memorandum Opinion on Appeal, at 5, R. at 1240). In support of this proposition 
the District Court cited to Payan and Ciccone-two criminal cases. These cases are 
distinguishable from this case, however, because of differences in the criminal and civil rules. 
Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, various post-trial motions can be brought that 
stop the time for appeal including a motion to reconsider under Rule 11, a motion for a new trial 
under Rule 59( a), or a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59( e). The criminal rules 
do not provide the same post-trial motions that toll the time for appeal as in civil cases except for 
LC.R. 35 (which the appellate court in Payan specifically noted was not filed within the 14 day 
period required to toll the time for appeal). In Ciccone, this Court even noted that "a party's 
motion capable of affecting the judgment may extend the 42-day period, but only if such motion 
is filed within 14 days of the judgment." Ciccone, 150 Idaho at 308, 246 P.3d at 958. The 
Plaintiff's Objection that was filed in this case was styled as a motion to alter or amend the 
judgment under Rule 59(e) and which was filed within the applicable 14 day time period. As 
such, the time for appeal was tolled until the entry of the Amended Judgment. 
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2. If the Judgment was a imal order, Susan may still appeal directly from any post-
trial order. 
Both the Judgment and the Amended Judgment provide for a mandatory adjustment in the 
valuation of the Vierstra Dairy ifthe 2009 taxes turned out to be different than $1,006,000. After 
the 2009 taxes were determined to be less than one-tenth of that amount, Susan moved to make 
the adjustment. What resulted was the Order re: Post Trial Motions. An appeal as a matter of 
right may be taken from "any order made after final judgment." LA.R. 11(a)(7) (emphasis 
added). See also Callaghan v. Callaghan, 142 Idaho 185, 191, 125 P.3d 1061, 1067 (2005) 
("The contempt order in this case was made after entry of the final judgment in the case. It was 
therefore clearly appealable as a final order .... "). As noted in Section A above, the District 
Court acknowledged that it had jurisdiction to consider Susan's appeal from the Order Re: Post 
Trial Motions as pertaining to her appeal from the denial of her Motion to Adjust. However, the 
District Court erred by not considering Susan's appeal ofthe speculative tax issue through that 
order as well. 
By the Order Re: Post Trial Motions, the Magistrate refused to make the adjustment 
required by the Judgment and Amended Judgment. Instead the order erroneously found that the 
$1,006,000 speculative tax would "more likely than not" occur rather than applying the law and 
finding the immediate and specific actual tax liability for 2009. Accordingly, as noted 
previously, the Judgment and Amended Judgment were effectively modified by the Magistrate's 
denial of Susan's Motion to Adjust. The inclusion of the speculative tax amounts fully ripened 
when the Magistrate changed its stance from the tax coming due in 2009 (as contained in the 
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Judgment and Amended Judgment) to the tax possibly coming due in the next three years. That 
is an entirely different issue that, by itself, can give rise to Susan's appeal of the tax issue. There 
was no speculation in the Magistrate's order that the value ofthe Vierstra Dairy be reduced by 
the actual 2009 taxes. Speculation was introduced into the Magistrate's analysis when it shifted 
from a $1,006,000 tax liability in 2009, or whatever the actual 2009 tax liability turned out to be, 
to a $1,006,000 tax liability due sometime over the next several years. The Magistrate was not 
presented with a motion to modify the Judgment or Amended Judgment justifying such a 
deviation and it did not have substantial and competent evidence for its conclusions, but altered 
its previous orders, at least in part, due to a concern for Michael to continue his refinancing. 
From that erroneous reasoning, Susan can appeal the inclusion of a speculative tax into the 
valuation of the Vierstra Dairy that is neither immediate and specific nor supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
Additionally, prior to the Order re: Post Trial Motions, there was nothing for Susan to 
appeal. Any erroneous analysis contained in the Judgment or Amended Judgment had been 
mitigated by the automatic adjustment. Susan knew the tax would not approach the $1,006,000 
figure based on the Vierstra Dairy's tax history and that the issue would resolve itself. Susan 
abided by the Judgment and Amended Judgment and sought the automatic adjustment to the 
dairy valuation based on the correct 2009 tax liability. Her request to enforce the Judgment and 
Amended Judgment was denied. The fact is, the Order re: Post Trial Motions finally adjudicated 
the rights of the parties relating to their claims of relief requested in the initial pleadings. Susan 
had not suffered any loss until this substantive and erroneous adjudication deprived her of nearly 
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$500,000 of her rightful share of community property. Susan may appeal, as of right, from the 
order causing that deprivation as it relates specifically to the expanded inclusion of the 
speculative tax liability. Accordingly, the District Court erred by dismissing her appeal ofthis 
issue from the Order Re: Post Trial Motions. 
3. If the Judgment was not a final order, then the Order re: Post Trial Motions, from 
which Susan appealed within 42 days, served as the final adjudication of the 
parties' claims. 
Ifthe above-referenced portions of the Judgment did not serve as a final determination of 
the parties' claims, then "the forty-two day period to file a notice of appeal begins to run once an 
order is entered that resolves all issues, grants all relief to which the prevailing party is entitled 
other than attorney fees and costs, and brings an end to a lawsuit." Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty's 
Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 148 Idaho 588, 591, 226 P.3d 530, 533 (2010) (emphasis added). In 
this case, if the Judgment was not final, then the order that ended the lawsuit and finally 
adjudicated the parties rights respecting the dairy operation and the effect of any speculative tax 
amounts was the Order re: Post Trial Motions entered May 18,2010. That order did not allow 
for alterations or adjustments in the future. It unequivocally provided for the valuation and 
distribution of the property with finality, thereby ending any issues regarding the purchase right 
and the inclusion ofthe speculative tax in the valuation of the dairy. Thus, the District Court had 
jurisdiction to review the Magistrate's erroneous inclusion of the speculative tax liability in its 
valuation of the Vierstra Dairy through Susan's timely appeal ofthe Order re: Post Trial 
Motions, because it was clearly filed within 42 days of that order. 
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VI. 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Susan requests her costs incurred in filing this appeal pursuant to Idaho law, including 
I.A.R. 40, and all reasonable attorney's fees incurred in pursuing this appeal pursuant to Idaho 
law, including I.A.R. 41 and I.C. § 12-121. Attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 are appropriate if 
an appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. See 
Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 514, 181 P.3d 435,440 (2007). In this case, Susan has 
sought enforcement of the Judgment and Amended Judgment as prepared by Michael. The plain 
language ofthose orders provides that Susan is entitled to the relief she has requested and 
provides that Michael should have provided the deficiency on his own accord upon the filling of 
the 2009 tax returns. He refused to abide by that order, which unreasonable refusal has caused 
enormous expense on Susan's part to seek implementation and enforcement ofthe Magistrate's 
orders. Such continued judicial intervention would have been unnecessary had Michael 
originally complied with the order. His actions leading to the filing of Susan's Motion to Adjust 
and the subsequent filing of this appeal, as well as his defense of this appeal have been frivolous, 
unreasonable or without foundation. Accordingly, should this Court determine that Susan is the 
prevailing party on appeal, Susan respectfully requests that this Court award her costs and 
attorney's fees incurred herewith. 
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VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred by dismissing Susan's appeal from the Magistrate's denial of her 
Motion to Adjust on the grounds that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to consider any 
modification. The District Court misconstrued Susan's motion and the Magistrate's invitation 
for the parties to petition the court to address the adjustments, ifnecessarY,as contemplating 
post-judgment modification. To the contrary, the automatic adjustment and Susan's Motion to 
Adjust contemplated implementation and enforcement of a final order valuing and dividing a 
community property asset. The District Court acknowledged that Susan's Motion to Adjust 
sought enforcement, but dismissed on jurisdictional grounds contrary to this Court's holding in 
Barley. Accordingly, Susan requests that this Court remand to the District Court with 
instructions to enter an order requiring the Magistrate to enforce the automatic adjustment 
contained in the Judgment and Amended Judgment. 
The District Court also erred by dismissing Susan's appeal of the speculative tax issue 
from the Amended Judgment and the Order Re: Post Trial Motions. If the Judgment was final, 
the District Court had jurisdiction to consider Susan's appeal either (1) because the filing of the 
Plaintiff's Objection terminated the time for filing a notice of appeal until the entry ofthe 
Amended Judgment pursuant to LA.R. 14(a); or (2) because the Order Re: Post Trial Motions 
and the Magistrate's refusal to enforce the Judgment and Amended Judgment modified those 
orders, allowing Susan to appeal the speculative tax issue as of right from the Order Re: Post 
Trial Motions pursuant to LA.R. 11 (a)(7). If the Judgment was not final, then the Order re: 
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Post Trial Motions served to finally adjudicate the parties' claims contained in the pleadings. In 
which case, Susan's appeal was timely. In any event, the District Court erred by dismissing 
Susan's appeal from the tax issue for lack of jurisdiction. Susan respectfully requests that this 
Court remand to the District Court with instructions to consider Susan's issue that the 
Magistrate's finding of a $1,006,000 tax liability over the next several years was too speculative 
to be considered in the valuation of the Vierstra Dairy. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 5th day of December, 2011. 
WRIGHT BROTHERS LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
4t3~,~~ Lisa B. Rodriguez . 
Attorney for Appellant Susan Vierstra 
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